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A bstract. This paper reports the analysis of an industrial implementa­
tion of the session-layer of a load-balancing software system. This soft­
ware comprises 7.5 thousand lines of C code. It is used for distribution 
of the print jobs among several document processors (workers). A large 
part of this commercially used software system has been modeled closely 
and analyzed using process-algebraic techniques. Several critical issues 
were discovered. Since the model was close to the code, all problems that 
were found in the model, could be traced back to the actual code result­
ing in concrete suggestions for improvement of the code. All in all, the 
analysis significantly improved the quality of this real-life system.
1 In trodu ction
In th is paper we consider the following real-life industrial case study. The IT P  
Docum ent P latform  (developed and m arketed by Aia Software BV) enables or­
ganizations to  produce critical business docum ents in a scalable and personalized 
environm ent. This application has a load-balancer, a process kernel th a t makes 
diverse docum ent processors and clients com m unicate w ith each other, d istribu te  
and execute tasks. This system  has been used satisfactorily for several years (in 
2007 in over 25 countries by more th an  800 custom ers). However, it comes every 
now and then  in an undesirable sta te . The goal of the project was to  inves­
tigate  to  w hat extent the  inter-process com m unication and synchronization of 
this load-balancer could be modeled and analyzed. The desired results had  to  be 
detailed enough to  give an advice on how to  avoid these undesirable situations, 
and to  suggest concrete code changes.
* This research was supported by SenterNovem Innovation Voucher Inv053967. The 
fourth author has also been supported by NWO Hefboom project 641.000.407.
The project has been perform ed in the  following phases: In a discussion with 
two employees of Aia Software (Stefan ten  H oedt and Rene Schreurs) we obtained 
the overall idea of the  s truc tu re  and the behavior of the software in general 
and the  parts  to  be modeled in particular. The relevant p a rts  were modeled in 
m CRL2 [1]. The session layer of the  load-balancer protocol was modeled quite 
closely to  the C code. B oth  the higher-level application layer and the underlying 
TCP-socket layer were modeled in an abstrac t m anner. The code and the model 
were reviewed by the LaQuSo-m odeler and the Aia-developer in order to  achieve 
the m axim al m atching. This led to  a num ber of changes in the  model, as well 
as to  a num ber of questions about the  code and a num ber of concrete desired 
properties th a t could be analyzed. The model was analyzed w ith the help of the 
model-checking techniques of the  m CRL2 toolset w .r.t. deadlock-freedom and 
a num ber of o ther starvation  and consistency properties th a t were form ulated 
together w ith the  client. This revealed 6 problem s in the C code. These problem s 
were accepted by Aia Software and incorporated  to  the production  release of the 
software system.
The type of analysis presented in th is paper is as such not new. It was 
perform ed before using different kinds of model checkers (e.g. im perative [2] 
and declarative [1]: see also the  related  work paragraph  below). Notew orthy 
characteristics of our work are th a t the model is very close to  the  code, the code 
is relatively large (7500 lines), the  code has been running w ithin a commercial 
p roduct for years and it has been improved several tim es while problem s still 
kept occurring, errors have been found th a t led to  code im provem ents and finally, 
problem s regarding the code have not occurred since the  code was corrected. This 
project was done w ith a model checker based on Process Algebra [3]. I t is the 
first tim e th a t a project w ith such characteristics was achieved w ith a model 
checker based on Process Algebra.
Related Work M any projects study  the  verification of the  design of a software 
system. K arl Palmskog in his M aster Thesis [4] studied using the SPIN model 
checker the design of a Session M anagem ent Protocol developed a t Ericsson 
Research. He has discovered a design flaw. This study  was done on the level of 
the design w ithout looking carefully a t the im plem ented code. Also on the design 
level, in [5] Janicki and He present the  verification of a W ireless Transaction 
Protocol design in SPIN. A nother verification project concerning model checking 
of the design of a software system  in m CRL2 is the parking garage project done 
by M athijssen and Pretorius [6]. In [7] Brock and Jackson prove correctness of 
an industrial im plem entation of a ‘fault to lerant com puter’ by creating a small 
abstrac t model in CSP.
A real-life code example was recently studied by Hessel and Pettersson  [8] 
w ith nice results. In contrast to  our project, they  do not model the code bu t use 
a black-box testing  approach.
In [9] an application of the  Verisoft model checking approach to  a software 
system  from Lucent is presented. The model checking was applied as a p a rt of 
the testing  procedure during the software development. The paper reports about
a large num ber of revealed errors, m ost of which indicated incorrect variable 
initializations.
A framework for C code analysis w ith CA D P [10] is presented in [11], where 
the m ethods of process graph extraction  and generation of an LTS for a C 
program  are described. In [12] the model checker M OPS was used to  model­
check safety properties of single-threaded C program s. This paper reports on 
autom atic analysis of a million lines of code.
The Java Pathfinder tool is described in [13] as a tool th a t is used to  find 
deadlocks and o ther behavioral properties in java program s. The tool has been 
used to  analyse software system s a t NASA. It is also used as the back-end model 
checker of the  B andera project [14]. The B andera project uses abstraction  tech­
niques based on abstraction-based program  specialization: a com bination of ab­
s trac t in terp re ta tion  and p artia l evaluation.
Research a t Microsoft C orporation  led by Thom as Ball has shown significant 
results for a restricted  subset of program s: device drivers. Using an autom atic 
analysis engine - called SLAM - th a t combines model checking w ith symbolic 
execution for the  language C, they  have successfully found m any errors in m any 
real-life industrial device drivers [15]. They do not support analysis of m ulti­
th readed  systems.
Probably, the  m ost related  work is perform ed by Holzm ann and Sm ith in [16]. 
Using SPIN they  followed the  developm ent of a piece of telephone call processing 
software of about 1600 lines of C code. T hey verified successfully so-called feature 
requirem ents. T hey found m any errors in different stages of the  development.
Organization o f the paper The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the case study  and the problem s th a t were to  be investigated. Section 3 presents 
the m CRL2 language and the toolset and the way they  were used in the modeling 
of the  case study. Section 4 presents details on the analysis w ith the mCRL2 
toolset and the issues th a t were detected. Section 5 contains conclusions and 
possibilities for future work. In the  Appendix a p a rt of the  C code and the 
corresponding p a rt of the  m CRL2 model are presented. The whole m CRL2 model 
can be found in the  A ppendix of [17].
2 In telligent T ext P rocessin g  (IT P ) and its L oad-B alancer
The Intelligent Text Processing system  is used to  prepare large quantities of 
docum ents to  be printed. Sometimes it is done in an interactive way, where 
additional inform ation is being asked from the client during the processing. In 
the early versions of the  IT P  software the clients could d irectly  com m unicate 
to  the document processors, b u t w ith the increased com plexity of the process­
ing jobs a coordinating m echanism  was needed. The task  of the load-balancer is 
to  d istribu te  the jobs of the clients to  the  available docum ent processors, w ith­
out actually  changing the application layer of the client-server com m unication 
protocol too  much (see Figure 1).
Due to  the evolutionary way the  IT P  software was developed in the late 
nineties, the  load-balancer has been im plem ented in C on the W indows platform
Fig. 1. ITP and a Load-Balancer in it.
m aking use of the  W indows Socket Library. The possibility of using a standard  
solution for load-balancing, like the  Linux virtual server, has not been used for 
a num ber of reasons.
A typical use-case scenario of the  load-balancer deploym ent is presented as 
a Message Sequence C hart on Figure 2. There, a client of the  load-balancer 
com m unicates w ith the client object and a docum ent processor com m unicates 
w ith the docum ent processor object. The client sends a request to  prin t and the 
docum ent processor sends a request for work. After th a t the docum ent processor 
object asks the client object for work and gets the answer. At th is point the 
client and the docum ent processor objects are linked together by a partnersh ip  
link. Further, the docum ent processor asks for additional d a ta  and goes to  a 
sleeping sta te . The client object gets the d a ta  from the client and wakes up the 
docum ent processor object. The docum ent processor object transfers the  d a ta  
to  the  docum ent processor.
2.1  Issu es an d  A rtifa c ts
The load-balancer software was developed in the late nineties and has been tested  
b o th  a t AIA and a t clients’ environm ents since th a t tim e. The system  has been 
in use in production  for quite some tim e now. During testing  and m aintenance 
a num ber of issues w ith the software have been fixed, bu t some item s rem ained 
unsolved till the  beginning of our project.
Most of these ‘difficult’ issues could be classified as follows:
— the  load-balancer would get to  a sta te  where it did not respond a t all to  the 
requests of neither clients nor docum ent processors;
— the  load-balancer would ignore the docum ent processors th a t were free and 
willing to  accept jobs;
Client Client object Document processor object Document processor
request to print
work?
work?
yes! (partners)
wake-up : get data
get data
data
wake-up : data ready
process data
Fig. 2 . A typical use-case scenario of the load-balancer.
— a client would not get any response from the  load-balancer about the  sta tu s 
of its jobs.
These issues occurred in rare situations, m ostly  on particu lar hardw are configu­
rations. R eproducing such errors was very difficult or impossible. R estarting  the 
system  solved the issue bu t it could occur again somewhere in the  future.
The com pany provided the source code in C for W indows (7681 lines) and 
the application layer protocol docum entation. Further inform ation was commu­
nicated during meetings, via phone calls and e-mail. Analysis of the  artifacts re­
vealed th a t the system  was a m ulti-threaded W indows application using m utual 
exclusion prim itives (mutexes, sem aphores) and m ultiple event synchronization 
(W aitForM ultipleO bjects). For the asynchronous I /O  and the network commu­
nication the  W indows Socket A dm inistration  and call-back functions were used. 
The reverse engineering of the design revealed the  s tructu re  of the load-balancer 
(see Figure 3). Here each client and each docum ent processor object has a request 
queue and a partnersh ip  link to  a possible partner. Each such object im plem ents 
a finite sta te  m achine th a t first waits for one of the  two events, either a network 
socket event or a wake-up event from a partner. A fter th a t, a certain  action is 
perform ed and the object proceeds to  a new state.
Based on the  source code and the revealed architecture of the load-balancer 
the following properties were considered to  be im portan t for the further analysis.
Fig. 3. Architecture of the load-balancer.
— The software should be free from deadlocks.
— C ertain  log messages are considered to  be of critical im portance. These 
should never occur as they  indicate th a t there is som ething fundam entally 
wrong w ith the system.
— The partnersh ip  links should be consistent, e.g., if the partn er of A is B  >  0 
(0 m eans no partner), then  the partn er of B  is either A or 0.
— W aiting for a partner should only be done if the partner link is not 0. This 
boils down to  the fact th a t a docum ent processor m ay not be in a sleeping 
sta te  if it has no partn er (except when a request is pending to  it).
— The num ber of tim es a th read  acquires a lock should be lim ited. In case a 
lock is acquired a m ultiple num ber of tim es it has to  be released the same 
num ber of times. If a th read  acquires a lock in a loop, a certain  bound 
induced by the  operating  system  can be reached, resulting in an undesired 
behavior. Moreover, a high num ber of nested lock acquisitions m ay indicate 
a logical error in the program .
— The num ber of requests th a t are pending in the  system  should be limited.
3 M odeling  in m CRL2
To check the  desired properties p a rt of the system  had  to  be formally modelled in 
a language th a t supports model-checking. For the reasons of available expertise 
we decided to  use m CRL2 and its toolset.
m CRL2 [1] is a process algebraic language th a t includes d a ta  and tim e. I t is an 
extension of the  language /¿CRL [18] w ith m ulti-actions, built-in  d a ta  types and 
local com m unication functions instead of a single global one. m CRL2 is basically 
intended to  study  description and analysis techniques for (large) d istribu ted  sys­
tem s. The abbreviation m CRL2 stands for milli Common Representation Lan­
guage 2.
An m CRL2 specification consists of two parts. The first p a rt specifies the 
d a ta  types, the  second p a rt defines the processes. D ata  are represented as term s 
of some sort, for example 2, c o s ( p i ) ,  and co n ca t(L 1 ,L 2 ) could be term s of sort 
n a tu ra l num ber, real num ber and list, respectively.
The process equations are defined in the  following way. S tarting  from a set 
Act of actions th a t can be param eterized w ith data , processes are defined by 
means of guarded recursive equations and the following operations.
F irst, there is a constant 6 (6 ^  Act) th a t cannot perform  any action and is 
called deadlock or inaction.
Next, there are the sequential com position operation • and the alternative 
com position operation  + . The process x  • y  first behaves as x and if x  successfully 
term inates continues to  behave as y. The process x +  y can either do an action 
of x and continue to  behave as x or do an action of y and continue to  behave as 
y.
Interleaving parallelism  is modeled by the operation ||. The process x || y is 
the result of interleaving actions of x and y, except th a t actions from x and y 
also synchronize to  m ultiactions. So a || b =  a • b +  b • a +  a | b. The com m unication 
operation r  allows m ultiactions to  communicate: param eterized actions a(d) and 
b(d') in r{ a|b ^ c|(a (d )  | b(d ')) com m unicate to  c(d), provided d =  d'.
To enforce th a t actions in processes x and y synchronize, we can prevent 
actions from happening on their own, using the encapsulation operator dH . The 
process dH (x) can perform  all actions of x except th a t actions in the  set H  are 
blocked. So, in d{a 5}(I{ a|b ^ c}(x || y)) the actions a and b are forced to  syn­
chronize to  c. A nother way to  restric t process behaviour is the allow operation. 
By specifying a list of m ultiactions one can prohibit all o ther m ultiactions by 
renam ing them  to  S. So V{a|b|(a || b) =  a | b.
We assume the existence of a special action t  ( t  ^  Act) th a t is in ternal and 
cannot be directly  observed. The hiding operator t j  renam es the actions in the 
set I  to  t  . By hiding all in ternal com m unications of a process only the external 
actions rem ain.
The following two operators combine d a ta  w ith processes. The sum  operator 
J2d-D P(d)  describes the  process th a t can execute the process p(d)  for some value 
d selected from the sort D. The conditional operator _ ^  _o _ describes the i f  - 
then-else. The process b ^  x  o y (where b is a boolean) has the behavior of x if 
b is tru e  and the  behavior of y if b is false. The expression b ^  x is a syntactic 
sugar representing the i f  -then  construction. It is an abbreviation to  b ^  x o S.
3.1  D e sc r ip tio n  o f  th e  m C R L 2 la n g u a g e
3.2  T h e  m C R L 2 T o o lse t
The m CRL2 toolset (h t tp : / /w w w .m c r l2 .o rg ) has been developed a t Technical 
University of Eindhoven to  support formal reasoning about system s specified in 
mCRL2. It is based on term  rew riting techniques and on formal transform ation 
of process-algebraic and d a ta  term s. At the m om ent it allows to  generate sta te  
spaces, search for deadlocks and particu lar actions, perform  symbolic optim iza­
tions for m CRL2 specifications and sim ulate them .
The toolset is constructed  around a restricted  form of mCRL2, nam ely the 
Linear Process Specification (LPS) form at. An LPS contains a single process 
definition of the  linear fo r m :
p ro c  P(x:D ) =  ^  ^  C i(x,yi) ^  a j(x ,y j)  • P (g (x ,y* ))
i£ i yi'-Ei
i n i t  P(do);
where d a ta  expressions of the form d ( x i , . . . ,  x n ) contain a t m ost free variables 
from {x1, . . . ,  x n }, I  is a finite index set, and for i G I  the following are:
— ci (x ,y i ) are boolean expressions representing the conditions,
— a i(x ,y i)  is a m ultiaction a 1(fi1(x, yi)) | ••• | ani ( f ”1 (x ,y i)), where f k (x ,y i) 
(for 1 <  k <  n i ) are the  param eters of action nam e ak,
— gi (x, yi ) is an expression of sort D  representing the  next sta te  of the  process 
definition P ;
— d0 is a closed d a ta  expression;
— 2 Pi is a shorthand  for p 1 +  • • • +  p n , where I  =  { 1 , . . . ,  n}.
The form of the sum m and as described above is sometimes presented as the 
condition-action -effect rule. In a particu lar s ta te  d and for some d a ta  value e 
the m ultiaction a i (d, e) can be done if condition ci (d, e) holds. The effect of the 
action on the s ta te  is given by the fact th a t the  next sta te  is gi (x ,y i ).
The tool m c rl2 2 lp s  checks w hether a certain  specification is a well formed 
m CRL2 and a ttem p ts  to  transform  it into a linearized (i.e. LPS) form (See [19] 
for the  detail of the linearization). All o ther tools use th is linearized form at as 
their s ta rting  point (see Figure 4).
These tools come in four kinds:
1. a tool (xsim) to  step  through the process specified in the LPS;
2. a tool ( l p s 2 l t s )  to  generate the labeled transition  system  (LTS) underlying 
a given LPS;
3. several tools to  optim ize the LPSs:
(a) lp s re w r, normalizes an LPS by rew riting the  d a ta  term s in it;
(b) lp sc o n s te lm , removes d a ta  param eters th a t are constant th roughout 
any run  of the  LPS;
(c) lp sp a re lm , reduces the  sta te  space of the  transition  system  by removing 
the d a ta  param eters and sum  variables th a t do not influence the behavior 
of the  system,
(d) lp s s t r u c te lm ,  expands variables of com pound d a ta  types;
4. a tool ( lp sp p ) to  prin t the  linearized specification.
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Fig. 4. The mCRL2 Toolset (www.mcrl2.org)
3.3  T h e  L o ad -B a lan cer  in  m C R L 2
For the m odeling we concentrated  on the session layer of the  load-balancer pro­
tocol. This layer is responsible for controlling the connections w ith the clients 
and the docum ent processors, e.g., establishing, breaking the  connection, han­
dling non-expected connection breaks and network errors. Sending and receiving 
of d a ta  goes th rough this layer as well.
The lower-level interface (back-end) of the session layer protocol goes to  the 
W indows Socket A dm inistration (WSA) library. This lib rary  is a p a rt of the 
operating system  and is responsible for sending and accepting network socket 
events from the application. In our m CRL2 model W SA is modelled as a part 
of the environm ent.
The high-level interface (front-end) of the session layer perform s calls to  the 
application layer of the  protocol. This happens when a certain  p a rt of d a ta  is 
received from a client or a docum ent processor in a sta te  when d a ta  is expected, 
or a connection is broken and th is fact has to  be noticed by the  application 
layer (sometimes the session layer can close the session itself and no action from 
the application layer is required). The code of the  application layer happens to  
be a ra ther large piece of homogeneous code, a large case d istinction so to  say. 
We modelled it by m aking an over-approxim ation of all possible behaviors and 
choosing them  in a non-determ inistic way. B y doing th is we ended up w ith less 
th an  ten  alternatives for the  application layer.
The model of the  session layer follows the C code in a way to  make it as precise 
as possible. The model resembles the  request handling and the  network events 
handling in m ost details, following the  s ta te-transition  paradigm  im plem ented in
the  code. A ppendix B presents a p a rt of the m CRL2 models th a t corresponds to  
the request handling session layer p a rt of the C -im plem entation in A ppendix A. 
The model and the code in these appendices follow each other ra th e r closely. 
The sizes of the  two specifications are more or less the  same.
The shared variables and arrays th a t are used for in ter-th read  communi­
cations are modelled by separate processes. P arts  of the  operating system  are 
modelled by processes as well. Below an m CRL2 process for the m utual exclusion 
prim itive of W indows (MSDN M utex objects) is presented. A th read  can acquire 
a m utex a m ultiple num ber of tim es and has to  release it the same num ber of 
times.
Lock(ow ner:N at, count:N at) =
(owner = =  0 V owner = =  tid ) ^  lock(tid) • Lock(tid, count +  1)
t id  :Pos
+  (owner >  0) ^  unlock(N at2Pos(ow ner))•
Lock(if (count = =  1, 0, owner), In t2N at(coun t — 1))
+  (count >  nM axLock) ^  _error(M axLock) • 6;
The process Lock has two n a tu ra l num bers as param eters. The first one repre­
sents the id of the th read  th a t owns the m utex, or is equal to  0 if the m utex 
is free. The second param eter is used to  count how m any tim es the m utex has 
been acquired.
The actions lock and unlock are param eterized by positive num bers repre­
senting the id of the locking/unlocking thread. Such a th read  would perform  a 
corresponding Jock or .unlock action param eterized w ith its id. The two corre­
sponding actions (w ith and w ithout the underscore) are then  forced to  synchro­
nize by the  process defining the entire system.
The first sum m and of the process Lock says th a t it can be acquired (by 
perform ing a Jock action) by a th read  w ith its id represented by the variable 
tid . This is allowed for a th read  w ith any id in case the m utex is free (condition 
owner = =  0), or for the owner th read  (owner = =  tid ). After this acquisition 
the lock is owned by the th read  identified by tid  and the acquisition num ber 
counter is increm ented.
The second sum m and says th a t a non-free m utex can be unlocked by the 
owner. Here we use N at2Pos to  cast the value of the  n a tu ra l variable owner to  
the positive num ber. This function m aps 0 to  0 and any num ber bigger th an  1 to  
itself. Given the condition owner >  0, this cast is always the  iden tity  m apping. 
The function In t2N at is used to  cast the integral value of count — 1 to  the natu ra l 
num ber. I t m aps the negative integers to  0 and does not change the non-negative 
integers. I t can be shown th a t owner >  0 = ^  count >  0 is an invariant of the 
Lock process. Therefore, th is cast is also an identity  m apping.
The th ird  sum m and lets the process perform  an _error action if the  value of 
count reaches a certain  lim it nM axLock . In this way, by checking for absence 
of _error actions, one can prove th a t the m utex is acquired in a nested way less 
th an  nMaxLock num ber of times.
3.4  M o d e lin g  th e  P r o p e r tie s
It tu rned  out th a t all the  desired properties (except for the  deadlock absence) 
could be modeled as safety properties and checked by adding _error actions to  
the model and check for them . For example, the partn er consistency property  
from Section 2.1 is m odelled as the following sum m and in the SharedConnection 
process:
E E (n =  0 A getpartner(connections .n) =  0 A
cid:Nat n : N a t  , , / ,• \ / ■ i\getpartner (connections .n) =  cid ) ^
setConnectionPartner(cid ,n )  • _error( W rongPartners) • 6
Here getpartner (connections .n) gives the  current p artn er link value for the  con­
nection n. Once an a ttem p t to  change the  partn er of connection cid to  the 
value n  is perform ed by one of the  th reads (by perform ing the  correspond­
ing _setConnectionPartner action w ith the  actual param eters), the  condition is 
checked and if it is true, the  error action is enabled. The condition says th a t 
neither n  nor the  partn er of connection n  is 0 (meaning ‘no p a rtn e r’) and the 
partner of n  is not cid . The la tte r condition m eans the actual partnersh ip  link 
inconsistency between n  and c id .
4 A nalysis and Issues
The model has been analyzed for the absence of deadlocks and for validity of 
certain  properties. These properties were incorporated  in the model itself so 
th a t an _error action would occur if the p roperty  is violated. In th is way the 
verification is perform ed by the  explicit generation of the entire state-space and 
by looking for the  _error actions and the deadlocks. Once one of th is is found in 
a particu lar s ta te , a m inim al trace to  this s ta te  gives a counterexam ple.
Perform ing the  analysis takes only a few steps th a t can be activated from 
the com m and line. To give the reader an idea how th is is done in practice, 
we give the actual com m ands w ith their actual param eters and options. As 
the first step, the  linearization of the  model takes place: w ith the com m and 
m c rl2 2 lp s  IT P p a tch ed .m crl2  IT P p a tc h e d .lp s  th a t produces the linearized 
version of the model. Next, we apply the optim ization steps on the LPS: lp s re w r  
IT P p a tc h e d .lp s  | lp s c o n s te lm  > IT P p a tc h e d _ o p t.lp s . The actual genera­
tion of the  transition  system  and checking for the  properties is done w ith the 
com m and l p s 2 l t s  -v rD t - a  _ e r r o r  -R j i t t y c  IT P p a tc h e d _ o p t.lp s  where 
the -D option enables deadlock checking and - a  _ e r r o r  enables checking for 
_error actions. The - t  option enables generation of trace files. In case a deadlock 
or an _error action is found, a trace file is generated w ith one of the  shortest 
traces to  th a t deadlock sta te  or a s ta te  where the _error action is possible. The 
trace files can be p rin ted  out w ith t r a c e p p  or sim ulated in the  xsim  sim ulator.
4 .1  E x p er im en ts  and  R e su lts
The analysis has been perform ed by an exhaustive generation of the underlying 
sta te  space using the m CRL2 toolset. The experim ents were carried out on a
com puter w ith 2.6GHz 64 bit AMD C PU s and 128Gb RAM running Linux. 
The execution tim es and the  resulting num bers of sta tes and transitions are 
presented in Table 1. The m CRL2 s ta te  space generator uses the depth-first 
search algorithm  (by default), and the  levels are the  levels of dep th  reached by 
perform ing the search. The cases w ith the  to ta l num ber of clients+docum ent 
processors larger th an  4 could not be fully analyzed.
clients DPs time levels states transitions
1 1 7m 38s 237 368k 796k
1 2 1h 42m 365 9.8m 21m
2 1 4h 52m 442 28m 61m
1 3 36h 480 209m 455.6m
2 2 7d6h 550 1.5b 31.9b
3 1 9d3h 637 1.8b 38.9b
Table 1. Execution time (days, hours, minutes and seconds), number of levels, number 
of states and number of transitions (thousands, millions and billions) for different 
numbers of clients and document processors (DPs).
4 .2  D e te c te d  Issu es
An early analysis of the  model revealed m ultiple modeling problems. A fter resolv­
ing these initial modeling problems, the model was com pared w ith the original 
C code by bo th  the m odeler and the au thor of the  C code working together. 
This revealed some essential difference between the code and the model. Once 
these differences were resolved, the m CRL2 tools were applied and the following 
issues were detected.
— Issu e  1. In one case partn er links were inconsistent. This was due to  the 
fact th a t in one place in the C code the ‘forw ard’ partner link was set to  0 
and the  ‘backw ard’ one was forgotten. This piece of code was found ‘unclear’ 
during the  model-code com parison activity, and la ter was confirmed to  be 
erroneous by the m CRL2 toolset finding a shortest trace to  the  property  
violation.
— In two cases a docum ent processor could end-up in a sleeping s ta te  w ithout 
having a partner.
•  Issu e  2. In one case this happened because the client’s p artner link was 
set to  0 before actually  waking up the docum ent processor (happened 
due to  an earlier bug ‘fix’). This problem  was found by the model-code 
com parison and la ter confirmed by the m CRL2 toolset.
•  Issu e  3. In another case it was sim ply forgotten to  wake-up the doc­
um ent processor. This problem  can be clearly explained by a use-case 
scenario in Figure 5. This use-case scenario is sim ilar to  the  one pre­
sented in Figure 2, w ith the  difference th a t after sending a request for 
d a ta  to  the client this client disconnects, instead of providing the actual 
data . This problem  was found using the tools.
— I t also happened th a t critical logs could occur in the program:
•  Issu e  4 . A client could send a request to  disconnect to  itself in a wrong 
s ta te , because changing of a s ta te  was forgotten;
•  Issu e  5. Request to  wake up could lead to  an inappropria te  s ta te  change 
when a docum ent processor was in the m iddle of a disconnection (found 
to  be non-critical).
— Issu e  6. The num ber of requests sent to  a client could exceed the preset 
lim it and could possibly be unbounded. This happened when a docum ent 
processor sent a request to  disconnect to  its partn er client and did not break 
the partnersh ip  afterwards.
These issues were analyzed and accepted by Aia and led to  modifications of the 
original C code. The corresponding modifications, fixing the problem s m entioned 
above, were also brought into the  model. The subsequent analysis of the model 
revealed no more property  violations.
Most of the issues were detected  in the  case of 1 client and 1 docum ent 
processor, while the rest in 1-2 or 2-1 situations. Analysis of the  situations w ith 
more clients and docum ent processors did not lead to  detection of new issues.
Client Client object Document processor object Document processor
request to print
work?
work?
yes! (partners)
wake-up : get data
get data
disconnect
wake-up : client went away
Fig. 5. A faulty scenario.
5 C onclusions and Future W ork
We m odelled the session layer of the IT P  load-balancer in m CRL2 such th a t the 
model is close to  the actual C code. A num ber of properties were verified using 
the m CRL2 toolset. This led to  the  discovery of 6 issues th a t were easily traced 
back to  the  actual C code. The code was repaired and also the corrections were 
brought into the model. The resulting model was verified w ith respect to  the 
desired properties by checking the entire s ta te  space for several configurations.
m CRL2 could be used successfully in th is industrial setting  of a load-balancer 
for docum ent production. A p a rt of the  operating system  services (sockets, locks, 
events, etc.) could also be modeled. U nfortunately  the verification could only be 
done on a restricted  setting, so an im provem ent of the toolset is required for 
bigger cases. Also an autom atic conformance checking of the  model w .r.t. the 
code could be of interest.
L esson s Learned: The case study  gave the  researchers more confidence 
th a t real-life examples can actually  be dealt w ith using a close-to-code model. It 
increases the m otivation to  further improve the power of the analysis tool and 
to  s ta r t investigating code generation from the  model (the proxim ity to  the code 
m ay simplify code generation).
Aia released the new version w ith the improved code about half a year ago. 
W hile previously it happened now and then  th a t their system s infrastructure 
came to  a standstill and had  to  be resta rted  again, th is situation  never occurred 
anymore w ith the new release. The infrastructure  (which has the  load-balancer 
as the  m ost critical p art) kept running all the  time.
They have now a working reference model in m CRL2 of a crucial p a rt of their 
load-balancer software. In principle, they  are able to  incorporate code changes 
into the model and check w hether the properties still hold for the new version. In 
practice, they  probably  need assistance of the researchers in the beginning. Aia 
has acquired an increased in terest in using formal models for analyzing software 
quality  aspects, in particu lar for the m ost critical p a rts  of their system.
F u tu re W ork: In the future an im provem ent of the  toolset could lead to  
model checking of bigger cases. Analyzing more properties of the session layer 
(e.g. verifying client notification of docum ent processor failures) could lead to  
certification of the software. If we w ant to  improve the relation between the 
model and the code, we can consider code generation d irectly  from the  model.
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A P art o f C code o f th e  R eq uest H andling
while (Interface->Request != (REQUEST *) NULL) {
REQUEST *Req = Interface->Request;
DWORD ID = Req->Connection - Req->Connection->Interface->Connections; 
switch (Req->Request){ 
case requestDisconnect:
/* Partner requests a disconnect */
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){ 
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_EVENT){
CancelEvent (Req->Connection);
} else if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_DISCONNECT&&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK ){
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Disconnect: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) ,
ShowConnState(STATE_DISCONNECT),
ID);
} else {
/* Our own connection was already shutting down. Just confirm it. */
}
}
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK){
Req->Connection->State = STATE_DISCONNECT;
}
break ; 
case requestSend: 
case requestReceive:
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){
CONNECTION *Partner;
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_BREAK ||
Req->Connection->State == STATE_DISCONNECT){
/* Lost connection to client */
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Remote host closed connection unexpectedly on socket /d. " , 
ID);
/* Detach our connection */
} else {
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Send/Receive: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) , 
ShowConnState(STATE_TRANSACTION) ,
ID);
}
*//* Remove our link to the partner 
WaitHandle (PartnerLock);
Partner = Req->Connection->Partner; 
Req->Connection->Partner = (CONNECTION *) NULL;
/* Wake the partner */
if (Partner != (CONNECTION *) NULL){
if (Partner->Partner == Req->Connection){ 
Partner->Partner = (CONNECTION *) NULL;
}
WakeConnection (Partner);
}
ReleaseMutex (PartnerLock);
/* And close our socket */
if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_BREAK){ 
Req->Connection->State = STATE_DISCONNECT;
}
break;
}
/* Start the requested operation */
Req->Connection->State = STATE_TRANSACTION;
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Req->Connection->Protocol = Req->NewState;
Req->Connection->Read = (Req->Request == requestReceive); 
Req->Connection->Write = (Req->Request == requestSend); 
Req->Connection->Size = Req->Size;
Req->Connection->Buffer = Req->Data; 
break ; 
case requestWakeUp:
/* Our partner finished its operations and tries to wake us up. */ 
if (Req->Connection->State == STATE_TRANSACTION){
/*
* We are already awake and handling transactions.
* Don’t change anything.
*/
} else if (Req->Connection->State != STATE_PENDING &&
Req->Connection->State != STATE_SLEEP){
/* Detach our connection */
LogMessage (ClassError ,
L"Wake up: Forcing illegal state switch /s->/s on socket /d", 
ShowConnState(Req->Connection->State) ,
ShowConnState(STATE_TRANSACTION),
ID);
} else {
Req->Connection->State = STATE_TRANSACTION ;
Req->Connection->Read = FALSE;
Req->Connection->Write = FALSE;
}
break;
default:
LogMessage (ClassError, L"INTERNAL ERROR: State /d. " , Req->Request); 
break;
}
Interface->Request = Req->Next;
Free (Req) ;
/* Reset event flag so we won’t delay processing the requests */
SetEvent (Interface ->Pending) ;
}
B C orresponding P art o f th e  m C R L2 M odel
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid:Pos,pending:Bool,nConns:Nat)= 
sum reqs: List(REQUEST).
_getRequests(tid,reqs).
(reqs==[])->_unlockPartner(tid).
(pending->_setPendingEvent (tid) .
TCP_WaitEvent(tid,nConns)
<>TCP_WaitEvent(tid,nConns)
)
<>_popRequest(tid).
TCP_ProcessRequest(tid,head(reqs),nConns);
TCP_ProcessRequest(tid:Pos,req:REQUEST,nConns:Nat)=
/ first we need to get the state of the connection in the request: 
sum state : STATE._getConnectionState(tid,getcid(req) ,state) .(
( (getname(req)==requestDisconnect &&
(state = = STATE_BREAK | | 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT)
) ||
(getname(req)==requestWakeUp &&
(state==STATE_TRANSACTION || 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT || 
state==STATE_BREAK)
)
)-> TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)<> / do nothing in these cases
(getname(req) ==requestDisconnect) ->(
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(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionState(tid,getcid(req),STATE_DISCONNECT). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)<>
/ otherwise log and force.
(state==SOCK_FREE || 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
st at e = = S OCK_READING | | 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
st at e = = S OCK_ SHUTDOWN | | 
state==STATE_TRANSACTION)
-> _log(tid,LogDisconnectForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req),
STATE_DISCONNECT)).
error(CriticalLog).
_setConnectionState(tid,getcid(req),STATE_DISCONNECT). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)
)<>
(getname(req) ==requestSend | | 
getname(req) ==requestReceive) ->(
(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionStateProtocolReadWrite( 
tid ,
getcid(req) ,
STATE_TRANSACTION , 
getnewprotocol(req), 
getname(req)==requestReceive , 
getname(req)==requestSend).
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)+
(state==STATE_BREAK || 
state==STATE_DISCONNECT)
-> _log(tid,LogRemoteHostClosedUnexpectedly(getcid(req))). 
TCP_ProcessRequest_Close(tid,getcid(req),nConns)+
(st at e = = STATE_EVENT | | 
state==SOCK_FREE | | 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
st at e = = S OCK_READING | | 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
state==SOCK_SHUTDOWN || 
state==STATE_TRANSACTION)
-> _log(tid,LogSendReceiveForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req) ,
STATE_TRANSACTION)).
error(CriticalLog).
TCP_ProcessRequest_Close(tid,getcid(req),nConns)
)<>
(getname(req) ==requestWakeUp) ->(
(state = = STATE_PENDING | | 
state==STATE_SLEEP)
-> _setConnectionStateReadWrite(tid,getcid(req),
STATE_TRANSACTION,false,false). 
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)<>
(state==STATE_BREAK || 
state==STATE_EVENT || 
state==SOCK_FREE | | 
state==SOCK_ACCEPT || 
st at e = = S OCK_READING | | 
state==SOCK_WRITING || 
state==SOCK_SHUTDOWN)
->_log(tid,LogWakeUpForsingIllegalStateSwitch(getcid(req),state)). 
error(CriticalLog).
TCP_ProcessRequests(tid,true,nConns)
)
)
